According to the essay co‑authored by Bruce Schneier and Cindy Cohn, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 triggered a government‑wide shift from targeted surveillance—such as individual wiretaps—to mass surveillance techniques like tapping the internet backbone and collecting telephone or internet metadata. The essay states that this legal and technical architecture was initially framed as a necessary defense against terrorist threats but has grown far beyond that justification and national security in general. It notes that mass surveillance is now a routine tool used by law enforcement, with ICE employing it in immigration actions and against people exercising First Amendment rights to protest, and that private security systems also use it, citing facial recognition at venues such as Madison Square Garden and networked Flock license‑plate capture systems on roads and in parking lots. The essay describes the interrelation between private and governmental mass surveillance, explaining that surveillance is the business model of the internet; companies like Google and Facebook constantly spy on users’ behavior, and governments obtain mass surveillance information primarily through these private companies. It adds that FBI Director Kash Patel confirmed in congressional testimony that the agency is purchasing information on Americans from data brokers and intends to continue doing so. The essay points out that as companies collect more information for surveillance‑capitalism purposes, more becomes available to law enforcement, and that as surveillance and analysis technologies improve—especially with increased use of AI—the problems associated with mass surveillance grow. It recalls that after 9/11 the idea that the government could surveil the population to safety took hold, with the fear of terrorism reaching a frequency and intensity never before seen and the belief that the enemy could be anyone, anywhere leading to a response of watching everyone, everywhere. The essay cites an internal NSA presentation made public via Edward Snowden’s 2013 disclosures that advocated a “Collect it All,” “Process it All,” “Exploit it All,” “Partner it All,” and “Sniff it All” approach, ultimately aiming to “Know it All.” The essay argues that the national security community has never provided a full analysis of the costs and benefits of these mass surveillance programs, either in taxpayer dollars or diversion of resources, nor demonstrated that the techniques stopped attacks that otherwise could not have been prevented. It notes that while the NSA occasionally presents examples of success, those examples regularly fall apart under serious scrutiny, and any potential utility must be weighed against the costs. Similarly, the essay says there has never been a comprehensive analysis of whether domestic immigration or law‑enforcement use of these techniques actually makes people safer, or whether other techniques could produce the same results; instead, police and companies selling the tools float anecdotes and dubious data, exemplified by Flock’s practice of equating the number of law‑enforcement hits in its database with actually solving crimes. Twenty‑five years after 9/11, the essay contends that it is reasonable to step back and evaluate the costs of the shift to mass surveillance, especially regarding Americans’ rights and freedoms. It describes specific shifts: the government’s post‑9/11 decision to collect Americans’ telephone records under the President’s Surveillance Program, later justified by a novel interpretation of Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which was rejected by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 2015 and led to the USA Freedom Act ending indiscriminate mass collection after nearly fourteen years. The essay also mentions the NSA’s Upstream program, which intercepted metadata and content from key telecommunications junctures inside the U.S., was brought under marginal FISA court review via Section 702 of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, ended content searches in 2017 after more than fifteen years but kept
